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This section assesses a range of interventions and responses that have been 
implemented in the face of natural disasters. This requires information on the characteristics 
of the shock itself; the strategies brought forward to deal with it; and the welfare outcomes 
derived from the interaction of these two. 
  Climate shocks are also known as covariant as they strike groups of households or 
entire communities at the same time. However, their scope could vary from a few households 
within a village to an entire country. In addition, the frequency, length and severity can vary 
widely across natural disasters having different implications for the implementation of 
responses. An earthquake despite being relatively short-spanned could have catastrophic 
consequences as opposed to a series of frequent, but less intense floods. The effectiveness of 
responses can also differ according to the length of the natural disaster; a one-off event (such 
as a hurricane) will have different implications than a more spread disaster as the case of 
droughts.  
    There are many ways in which climate shocks and their consequences try to be 
handled. It is common to group strategies by objectives and mechanisms.
1 By objectives, 
there are risk prevention mechanisms employed to avoid the materialization of the risk, for 
instance, resettlement in volcanic-prone areas or civil works projects, such as constructing 
levees to avoid flooding. If the risk cannot be prevented risk mitigation mechanisms are 
employed to lower exposure to it via diversification of income sources or access to credit and 
insurance, including self-insurance and mutual support networks. Finally, there are risk 
coping mechanisms used to cope with natural disasters after they have occurred. Some 
measures include the intensification or expansion of household labour by augmenting the 
number of hours of those already employed or bringing new members into work and 
withdrawing children from school, drawing down assets, reducing or minimizing household 
expenditures, and calling on support networks. Similarly, the government may provide ex 
post relief in the form of food-aid, emergency medical assistance and evacuation or 
construction of temporary shelters. 
The above strategies can be further refined according to the nature of the arrangement 
that mediates their implementation. There are informal arrangements such as the private 
transfers that originate from social networks and group-based informal insurance 
mechanisms. Similarly, self-insurance strategies such as savings in the form of stored grain, 
small and large livestock, jewelry, durables for potential sales during hardships or borrowing 
from friends, relatives, moneylenders or the workplace are all considered informal. In 
contrast, formal arrangements involve market goods and services such as the acquisition of 
accident, disability or crop insurance and access to credit from financial institutions, as well 
as publicly-provided goods including infrastructure, public health and education facilities, and 
the provision of direct cash assistance and public work programs or enacting building codes 
for disaster prone areas as a preventive strategy. In turn, both types of arrangements can be 
placed along a continuum depending on the instance that carries them out (i.e., individual or 
household, community or government). Certainly, during climate shocks one observes a 
combination of more than one of the above. 
An insufficient response to climate shocks creates a welfare-damaging gap that could 
be appreciated in a series of outcomes. In particular, impact evaluations of ongoing programs 
can be informative about the effectiveness of the program to breach this gap. This forms the 
basis of the analysis. At other times, however, the studies take a “black box” approach with 
regard to the risk mitigating mechanisms that might have contributed to the welfare outcomes 
observed (i.e., consumption). Finally, many other assessments reviewed here lack strong 
quantitative analysis and are based mostly in self-evaluations or qualitative interviews with 
the intended beneficiaries and providers. These findings are also informative, but their origin 
should be borne in mind.  
The main findings of this review stand as follows: (i) the reliance on asset-based self-
insurance and group risk-sharing mechanisms is insufficient to deal with natural disasters.  
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Consumption smoothing is often not achieved through these private means due to numerous 
constraints, including the riskiness of assets and the covariance of natural disasters. This calls 
for the involvement of a wider set of actors including NGOs, multilateral and bilateral 
development institutions, private sector, and governments and local institutions; 
(ii) The existing complementarities across actors involved in the creation of a social 
protection system against climate shocks should not mask potential problems that might arise 
from these interactions as well. In particular, much evidence is still needed on the efficiency 
and equity of public systems relative to informal institutions, and the incidence and 
distribution of crowding-out; (iii) Governments in the past have responded to natural disasters 
mainly through in-kind disaster relief, but more recently there has been a tendency to 
emphasise cash transfers as well. Both components should be part of a broader counter-
cyclical social policy that strengthens current disaster management programs and expands, 
when feasible, the role of social assistance. The type of climate shock (i.e., slow onset events: 
droughts versus rapid onset events: hurricanes or tsunamis), and various ex ante conditions, 
including institutional capacities at different government levels and the situation of markets 
will determine the appropriate mix of cash/food responses to the disasters caused by climate 
shocks; (iv) Even if both cash and in-kind measures are adopted as part of a broader risk 
management policy further effectiveness could be accomplished by adopting disaster 
reduction and mitigation mechanisms that address the structural factors which make 
households more vulnerable to natural disasters. Having mechanisms in place before the 
realization of a climate shock is fundamental. At the macro level, early warning systems and 
social funds that can involve community-based initiatives seem particularly relevant. At the 
micro-level, providing households with safer assets, especially savings, and avoiding physical 
asset-based risk management strategies by focusing on the provision of credit for productive 
purposes and insurance products are the best solutions devised; (v) There should be flexibility 
to adopt interventions (i.e., to bring in the most suitable interventions within a range of 
options and combine policies in the presence of synergies) as well as a solid basis to scale 
them up in a timely fashion. For instance, in a drought-induced food security crisis, if local 
food markets are functioning well cash transfers should be provided rather than food aid. But 
if children are among the most affected groups this measure might be accompanied by a child 
feeding program to address the loss of control over the money transfer once it reaches the 
family. Finally, there seem to be mounting pressures for scaling up cash schemes and 
weather-indexed insurance products, in some cases to the national level, especially in the 
context of longer-term social protection strategies. However, capacities on the ground should 




When climate shocks hit households in contexts characterized by widespread poverty and 
precarious access to credit and insurance markets it is not surprising to find that most of the 
responses to them are based on self-help and informal mechanisms. Supplying more work is 
by far the most important strategy. This makes sense considering that labour is the most 
abundant resource that households have at disposal. Borrowing money most probably from 
friends, relatives or local moneylenders, rather than banks, comes afterwards. Another 
informal source follows the sequence: receiving help from relatives, friends or neighbours. 
Selling animals and assets is done less regularly probably because they are most valued or 
simply less available. Finally, government help is usually reported as the least likely device to 
which households turn in case of hardship (de la Fuente, 2006; World Bank, 2005; Tesliuc 
and Lindert, 2002). 
Does assiduous reliance on informal mechanisms means they are more effective? The 
extensive literature on consumption smoothing reveals that most of these informal strategies 
are insufficient for managing and coping with climate shocks as consumption shortfalls 
remain high. Moreover, this literature alludes to the existence of inter-household transfers, 
loans  and other means of dealing with shocks, but only takes into account their net 
contribution at once to determine whether they allow households to smooth consumption.  
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This is of little help as it is hard to disentangle the individual effects of all available 
mechanisms (Morduch 1999).   
  
Self-insurance 
Most self-insurance responses to climate shocks in developing countries are asset-based. 
Therefore, an alternative way to assess the effectiveness of traditional self-insurance is 
looking at the performance of different asset attributes in the presence of climate shocks. The 
characteristics that appear to be more important to manage natural disasters at least in rural 
areas are: divisibility; ease of sale or mortgage, and good price value during hardship 
(Dercon, 2005). 
Divisibility means that physical assets should be easy to sale or mortgage to be 
reliable buffer stocks. For livestock, regarded as an important mechanism to insulate 
consumption from fluctuations in income in rural areas (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993), 
divisibility is a serious problem: livestock usually requires a sizable outlay to acquire it and 
thus a strong capacity to save. This is often not possible in small-size household economies. 
There is evidence in this respect across rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa. In western 
Tanzania, for example, buying a cow costs about a fifth of mean annual crop income. As a 
result few households can afford to equip themselves with enough units of livestock and 
therefore are more exposed to serious threats. For instance, during the 1981-85 drought in 
Burkina Faso livestock sales compensated for only 15-30 percent of the shortfall in crop 
income (Czukas, et al., 1998). 
Even if households are able to pile up enough livestock, their usefulness could be 
seriously hindered by climate disasters. If traditional buffer asset values hold a strong 
covariance with the household sources of income that could lead to low asset returns just 
when they are more needed. This is so because aggregate shocks, such as droughts or floods, 
typically affect income generating sources (i.e., crop yields) drying up cash flows into the 
household, but at the same time damage or extinguish those assets that could lessen the 
impact caused by income drops, most notably livestock (Dercon, 2005).    
A related problem with buffer assets in the presence of a natural disaster is that the 
terms of trade between them and goods for consumption are altered by the aggregate effect of 
the shock. As noted in the previous section, during droughts many households might be 
tempted or forced to sell their livestock to ease liquidity constraints, but if everyone follows 
the same action the sale price goes down. At the same time, the price of food is usually 
pushed up by its scarcity and thus the purchasing power of livestock relative to food 
deteriorates. The expected gains in consumption from the distress sale of assets are so slim 
that households stop their sale at the expense of affecting other welfare outcomes. For 
instance, during the 1984-85 famine in Ethiopia asset terms of trade collapsed, and 
households cut their consumption drastically rather than selling assets (Dercon, 2005). 
Moreover, if the climate shock is likely to persist over time informal asset-based 
strategies are likely to experience further limitations. It has been shown that if bad conditions 
persist over various years households would have to have large stores of assets otherwise 
consumption smoothing is unlikely to be accomplished (Deaton, 1992). This is what makes 
drought and flood especially bad within the different types of natural disasters (Morduch 
1999). 
The interplay between climate shocks and destocking assets is far from conclusive. It 
seems more an empirical matter that needs to be continuously tested. However, it appears that 
self-insurance mechanisms are especially weak in places and at times when are most needed 
precisely because many of the assets that households rely on are fairly circumscribed and 
markets for them are very restricted making them highly risky. Counter-cyclical safety nets 
that mitigate asset-price shocks might be promising developments in this respect. In recent 
times, the government of Kenya has put in practice a subsidy to livestock transport in pastoral 
regions aimed at reducing the trucking cost of animals in times of drought. This would 
increase the price that distressed herders are able to receive for their animals. Similarly, 
Botswana has responded to droughts by purchasing animals on government account in 
affected areas (Alderman and Haque, 2006).  
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   Informal Risk Sharing Mechanisms 
Besides self-insurance through asset savings, households engage in risk sharing arrangements 
to borrow money and goods in case of need during hardships. This borrowing most often 
comes from friends and neighbours in the form of group-based mutual support networks such 
as occupational associations and local borrowing schemes and from relatives as part of the 
extended family. However, it is increasingly acknowledged that informal risk-sharing 
institutions cannot handle natural disasters precisely because these affect many households 
simultaneously wiping out the entire network’s resources and thus making it difficult to share 
risk (Morduch, 1999; Skoufias, 2003). In other words, given that credit markets are personal 
and spatially restricted, especially in rural areas; common climate shocks render them 
ineffective. In addition, it appears to be that these institutions are very slow to handle changes 
like large shocks. For instance, large shocks would change risk distributions requiring some 
restructuring of existing arrangements. This could possible exclude certain groups or 
undermine the social norms and sanctions sustaining these mechanisms (Dercon 2005). 
There is plenty of evidence that informal risk sharing against income fluctuations 
derived from erratic rainfall takes place across regions as diverse as Ivory Coast, India, 
Thailand, Ethiopia and Uganda. As with self-insurance, this is far from perfect, but at least 
offers some protection in contexts where market-based insurance is not very accessible 
(Townsend 1994, 1995; Dercon and Krishnan 2000). More critically, once again the evidence 
available takes a ‘black box’ approach to the mechanisms by which consumption is smoothed: 
the results are consistent with both gift exchange within communities -but not with perfect 
risk sharing- and with self-insurance activities such as borrowing and saving -but not with the 
perfect ability to smooth consumption-.  
Even market-based coping mechanisms such as borrowing from formal financial 
institutions can become ineffective during macro shocks. For instance, when a natural disaster 
affects a whole village, being a member of a rural financial institution where the majority of 
deposits are from community members engaged in agricultural activities may be of little help 
for lending purposes because most probably those deposits will be withdrawn to face any 
resulting flood or harvest failure (Skoufias, 2003). 
The only exception to ineffective risk pooling between families during climate shocks 
is when family members or friends live outside the stricken community. Informal 
arrangements in the form of migration and remittances from other areas of the country and/or 
abroad can become a useful cross-country insurance mechanism because risks are not highly 
positively correlated (Townsend, 1994). But even in those instances, support is not always 
guaranteed or the reported transfers have minor impacts. For instance, in the smaller 
ICRISAT survey of poor villages in rural South India, it was found that transfers respond to 
risk but that they cover less than 10 percent of the typical shortfalls in income (Rosenzweig, 
1988). In fact, borrowing and saving are typically far more important coping mechanisms in 
practice than the exchange of transfers (Morduch, 1999). 
  
Public Interventions  
The reliance on informal strategies undertaken at the household and community level, such as 
asset-based self-insurance and group risk-sharing mechanisms is insufficient to deal with 
natural disasters. Consumption smoothing is often not achieved through these private means 
due to numerous constraints, including the riskiness of assets and the covariance of natural 
disasters. In consequence, households end up resorting to non-optimal coping mechanisms, 
such as cutting back food consumption below adequate levels. Altogether this evidence calls 
for the involvement of government and other instances.  
Governments tend to embark in multiple ex ante and ex post strategies to deal with 
natural disasters. In the past, they have traditionally responded through in-kind disaster relief, 
but more recently there has been a tendency to emphasise cash transfers as well. Even if both 
measures are adopted further effectiveness could be accomplished by adopting disaster 






Transfers to individuals in the wake of natural disasters can either be provided in-kind, in the 
form of food aid, shelter materials, agricultural inputs or blankets, or in cash, enabling people 
to decide for themselves what they most need, and to buy it in local markets. According to a 
recent review on cash-based responses to emergency relief, efforts have traditionally focused 
on the former, but also the dominance of this approach is starting to erode while experiences 
with cash and voucher schemes is increasing (Harvey, 2005).
2 
A three-year research project looking into the role of cash transfers (cash grants, cash 
for work, conditional cash transfers and voucher programs) during emergencies, in settings as 
diverse as Ethiopia, the 2004 tsunami affected countries, Pakistan and Zambia and Malawi 
found that providing people with cash or money [during natural disasters] was successful in 
terms of their impact. Money was spent sensibly, cash projects did not result in sustained 
price rises and women –one of the most vulnerable groups to climate shocks- were able to 
participate and have a say on how cash was spent (Harvey, 2007; Adams, 2007). 
Relative to food aid cash transfers can play a more useful role in the following ways: 
First, they can provide households with the highest flexibility on how to use them. Similarly, 
they can be most cost-effective and timely in the sense that once the infrastructure and 
distribution technologies are in place, the cost of operating cash transfer programs would 
often be much lower that the cost of providing in-kind assistance and even more safe. Third, it 
could have beneficial knock-on effects on local economic activity provided food and goods 
are available in local markets. And finally, if cash transfers are conditional they can deter the 
use of erosive coping strategies, including child labour (Harvey, 2007a; de Janvry et al., 
2006).  
Many NGOs, including Oxfam GB, Novib, the Red Cross and Save the Children, 
have used cash transfers in emergency contexts, including recent droughts in Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Somalia, floods in Bangladesh, Haiti and Mozambique, Hurricane Mitch in Guatemala 
and Nicaragua, and the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. In 2005/06, the World Food 
Programme successfully piloted a cash transfer scheme in Sri Lanka as a post-tsunami 
recovery measure (Devereux, 2006). This program gave place to the most thorough 
evaluation of a cash transfer pilot program designed explicitly to compare cash and food aid. 
In this it was found some significant changes in consumption patterns between cash- and 
food-receiving households. Consumption of staples (e.g. rice) increased for food households, 
and declined for cash households. In fact, cash households tended to consume less food in 
terms of quantity, but of higher quality (basically switching to meat, dairy products and 
packaged foods). The cash program also increased spending on clothing and footwear and 
almost half of the cash households reported using the cash to finance business and home 
improvements. However, there were also indications that cash created some disincentive to 
work relative to food and that on average half of the beneficiaries preferred cash and half 
food. As for the operational tradeoffs, almost 60% of food households incurred in additional 
costs in transporting ration to home and cash was quicker (2hours) to collect than food 
(3hours) and almost 5% cheaper to implement (Harvey, 2007; WFP, 2006).
3 
However, there are some valid concerns related to the implementation of public 
money transfers. They might be impractical because of the risks of corruption and insecurity 
incurred, as well as more difficult to target than commodities given that traditional mean-
tested or geographical targeting methods would be inaccurate to capture the transient poor 
resulting from climate shocks. Even if these issues are sorted out, there are concerns about the 
proneness [of cash transfers] to strain the social fabric due to the traditional exclusion of 
women and the misuse of cash in local communities and once it enters the household. In fact, 
the design of emergency aid and safety nets towards the more vulnerable members of 
household during weather shocks must take into consideration the intermediary role of 
families. Once transfers go into the household due to reallocations of resources within it 
policy makers have no direct control. Some of these issues are likely to remain valid concerns 





Cash for work (CFW) 
Labor-based employment schemes, public works and employment-intensive infrastructure 
programs remain the most common type of cash-based emergency responses and have 
disproved some of the most common arguments contended against cash transfers. A recent 
Mercy Corps CFW program in Aceh, Indonesia in response to the 2004 tsunami reported as 
part of its main impacts that 91 percent of participants indicated that cash facilitated return to 
their communities and gave communities an opportunity to work together. Moreover, the 
program was implemented only two weeks after the tsunami in around 60 villages and at a 
peak had nearly 18, 000 participants. This proved that cash disbursements could be safely 
delivered on a widespread basis in emergencies and that when implemented on a short-term 
basis, can have positive impacts at the individual and community level (Doocy et al, 2006).  
In a similar fashion, the Action Contre la Faim CFW program implemented against 
drought in the Wajid region of southern Somalia in 2004 proved an efficient way to deliver 
relief.
4 Concerns about security and exclusion of those requiring support proved ill-founded. 
With cash being highly portable and not as visible as large-scale commodity distributions the 
looting of trucks or vehicles, such as boats, that occurs relatively frequently in Somalia during 
commodity distributions was avoided.  The other great success of the program was the 
targeting method which usually represents an important feature for cash-based schemes. For 
both security and targeting issues were managed to a large extent with the enhanced 
involvement of the communities and village leaders. A two-level targeting system (village 
targeting led by the aid agency, followed by community managed targeting at the household 
level) proved satisfactory. The public works component (i.e., water catchments) of the 
program facilitated even more the targeting because the traditional management system for 
water catchments customarily involved some of the most vulnerable families in villages in 
their operation and maintenance (Mattinen and Ogden, 2006).  
Addressing the usual concerns about cash for work schemes does not mean their most 
attractive features should be left without scrutiny. There is ample evidence of public works 
creating poorly build infrastructure and assets. Having a work requirement and getting the 
right wage rates to attract the truly needy and thus avoiding the identification of beneficiaries 
could also be problematic. For instance, linking work on community projects to payment 
could make communities less willing to work on a voluntary basis in future years (Harvey, 
2007a). Setting very low wages to encourage self-targeting may leave participants unable to 
meet their basic needs. In contrast, too high wages may saturate the capacity of the providing 
agency to sustain the program as well as disrupt local labour markets by absorbing workers 
from nearby villages and other job markets.
5 Finally, even if wage rates are correct, certain 
groups may not be reached by the scheme, for instance, women that have to look after their 
children may not find time to take part or in general people surviving during or recovering 
from emergencies are almost always more than fully occupied rebuilding their livelihoods, so 
careful thought is needed before imposing onerous work requirements that may undermine 
their own attempts to recovery (Dercon, 2006; Harvey 2007a). 
More generally, transfer policy interventions cash and in-kind alike should be tailored 
to the special needs of the most vulnerable groups to climate shocks —women, children, and 
the elderly—. Involving women in the management of shelters, establishing workfare 
programs adapted to their needs, and ensuring gender neutrality in housing acquisition can 
improve the recovery for women and households headed by women. Expanding early 
childhood development programs for newborn infants, particularly mother and child feeding 
programs, is also very important. Rebuilding schools should be a top priority—to avoid loss 
of human capital and perhaps to provide shelter for displaced people (World Bank, 2002). 
Yet, some of the available evidence on social insurance schemes and policies ensuring food 
security to shield infants from the health consequences of temporary environmental shocks 
shows that this are not always successful (Munro, 2002). 
The key issues for CFW programs successful implementation are the government 
budgets, where to set the wage, the eligibility criteria to determine whether projects can be 
self-targeted, and if not how to select participants, how to address the needs of those unable to  
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work, the quality of assets being built, what sort of work to get people to do and how to 
measure and monitor the work being done (Morduch, 1999; Harvey, 2007a). 
 
Is it possible to design a transfer system that serves the dual role of alleviating 
poverty and insurance simultaneously? 
To the extent that cash can be used for emergency situations ways should be investigated to 
link emergency response more closely with social protection systems and safety nets that 
increasingly have a cash-based component. This could happen in two different ways. In 
places where cash transfer mechanisms already exist as part of a wider social protection 
safety net, it might be possible to expand the welfare safety nets during periods of crisis, to 
help people to deal with shocks. For instance, based on the positive impact of the human 
capital conditional cash transfer program on poor families in Nicaragua since 2000, the Red 
de Protección Social (RPS), the Government of that country along with the World Bank has 
been designing a pilot that aims at targeting cash transfers to families that are vulnerable to 
exogenous aggregate shocks, such as droughts. Focusing on six municipalities in a region 
frequently affected by droughts, the program has two main objectives: (i) strengthen 
households’ ex‐ante risk management strategies that aim at improving human and physical 
capital accumulation, thus reducing short and long-run vulnerabilities to shocks (e.g. exposure 
to drought); and (ii) reduce the impact of aggregate shocks on human and physical capital 
investments by decreasing the need for ex‐post, adverse coping mechanism through cash 
transfers. 
It seems that attaching conditionality on cash transfers is vital to achieve any desired 
risk-mitigating effect. A recent analysis into rural households in Mexico shows that natural 
disasters have large effects in taking children out of school and also induces them to increase 
their work participation. Yet, Progresa transfers conditional on sending children to school 
largely or completely protected children from the effect of these shocks on school enrolment. 
The income effect of the transfers was still not sufficient to affect household behaviour with 
respect to the use of child work in response to shocks (de Janvry, et al., 2006).
6  
Another aspect to consider before linking any emergency responses to existing safety 
nets is that means testing and geographic targeting were conceived to identify the structurally 
poor and thus could fail to identify the temporary poor generated by a natural disaster 
(Skoufias, 2003). The question goes beyond pouring more cash into those households already 
in the program, but to decide if the program has the built-in flexibility to expand coverage to 
households falling below the poverty line during times of crises and if self-targeting 
mechanisms need to be employed additionally to provide both the transfer and insurance. In 
this sense, traditional safety nets should not be idealized as they can have a limited ability to 
cope with disasters when scaled up due to design issues (chronic versus transient poverty) and 
limited local level capacity for scaling up (World Bank, 2005).  
There may also be opportunities to develop cash transfers that began as emergency 
interventions into longer-term social protection programmes as a way to break cyclical 
dependence on aid and, more importantly, address some aspects of chronic poverty. In 
contexts such as Ethiopia and northern Kenya, for instance, aid providers have discussed 
moving from food to cash-based safety nets as a way to strengthen the pastoralists’ income-
smoothing capacity and thus manage the drought cycle more appropriately. As opposed to the 
short-notice with which food relief is brought and the difficulties involved in setting the type 
and levels of help needed, a standard transfer for all conditions (though not ruling out extra 
assistance for a particularly severe drought) could improve herd management by allowing  
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pastoralists to increase their herds in good years, so that they can sell more animals in worse 
years (Harvey, 2007).  Reducing the humanitarian caseload by addressing chronic poverty is 
another way of expressing the pre-eminence that ex ante responses should take. 
Two last considerations should be made with regard to the policy implications of 
adopting cash-transfer mechanisms to cope with climate shocks as part of a broader social 
protection system. One is on the robustness of the evidence, according to a six-country review 
of cash-based experiences the studies do not seem to have reached that ‘critical mass’ 
necessary to draw reliable lessons (WFP, 2006). The number of cash transfer studies is still 
marginal compared to the magnitude of food aid operations and experience. Moreover, with 
the exception of cases as the WFP’s Sri Lanka pilot cash transfers have been self-evaluated by 
the implementing NGOs and often lack strong quantitative analysis, including household 
baseline information, follow-up surveys and sound panel data for market analysis. The second 
warning is that a possible mismatch between evidence, policy and capacity could happen. 
There seem to be mounting pressures for scaling up cash schemes, in some cases to the 
national level, especially in the context of longer-term social protection strategies. However, 
as noted before, limited capacities on the ground are often severe constraints for rapid scaling 
up. Capacities should thus be carefully assessed and built before any attempt to implement 
large-scale cash transfers (WFP, 2006). 
 
Food Aid 
It cannot be assumed that longer-term cash-based safety nets will be a substitute for 
humanitarian relief always. Not all climate shocks will be suitable for cash injections or not at 
all times leaving a predominant role for food aid. For instance, efficient cash transfer 
implementation requires sound delivery mechanisms and administrative capacities that are to 
certain extent familiar with cash flows, but may not be present in the most remote areas. A 
long-term safety net may reduce people’s vulnerability to food insecurity, but in the 
immediate aftermath of a drought or flood (first 1-3 months) cash may not be appropriate due 
to medium-short term contingencies in market dynamics (i.e., non-availability or restricted 
food markets) or surges in staple prices. Take for example the cash-for-work winter irrigation 
initiative among vulnerable households affected by the drought in Malawi in 2005. The 
program assessment revealed that beneficiaries unanimously agreed that they would have 
been better with food transfers than cash transfers especially during the period of 
implementation because maize prices were skyrocketing. Women beneficiaries of both cash 
and food interventions also observed that food transfers would be preferred because their 
husbands normally do not take the food away from them unlike cash (WFP, 2006). Similarly, 
an econometric analysis on the merits of a foodgrain program for Bangladesh in 1998/99 
shortly after the massive floods that affected that country indicated that transfers-in-kind 
targeted to poor women and children lead to greater wheat consumption than would result 
from an equivalent increase in cash income. Even though other factors including the cost of 
delivery, efficiency of targeting and policy objective need to be factored in during a final 
assessment, the study concluded that the marginal propensity to consume wheat from wheat 
transfers is large enough to have significant implications for the wheat consumption and the 
design of the program (del Ninno and Dorosh, 2003). 
In addition, beneficiaries may well prefer food over cash if they live in remote areas 
distant from main markets as opposed to those whose closeness to markets makes it easier to 
spend cash on the desired goods; in addition, food relief may be more desired during the lean 
season, or hungry ‘period’ whereas cash relief  would be more appropriate right after the 
harvest, when food is likely to be available in markets; and finally, cultural habits on the 
management of cash resources within the households make women more likely to prefer food 
transfers, while men prefer cash (WFP, 2006). 
Food aid is also likely to have its own difficulties. Some of the problems embedded in 
this mechanism are well-known: leakage to non-targeted individuals in the household or 
region combined with missing intended beneficiaries (bringing low humanitarian impact); 
highly pro-cyclical deliveries destabilizing food availability and great delivery lags; product 
price effects if local food markets are functioning well and labor supply disincentives (Barrett  
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and Maxwell, 2005). Most of these aspects came in during a series of impact evaluations of 
food aid programs implemented after three nationwide emergencies: the 1998 floods in 
Bangladesh, the 2002 drought in Ethiopia, and the 2001-02 failed maize harvest in Malawi.  
All three cases show limited long-term impact on asset holdings and future consumption in 
the aggregate from either food-for-work or free food distribution, although positive impacts 
were found for some groups of recipients in all three studies. The sparse average impacts 
appear to be related to quantity, timing, and targeting. Households received only small 
amounts of food aid, when compared with their total consumption. In addition, some of the 
transfers arrived months after the crisis began. In many instances, they were not regularly 
available or sustained for more than a season. And targeting was in many cases inconsistent 
or ambiguous as to whether to focus on the poorest or those most affected by crisis 
(IFPRI/WFP 2006; Quisumbing, 2005; Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2006; Sharma, 2005). 
In fact, the nature of in-kind aid seems also limiting to assist those who suffered 
greater losses or who are poorer following a disaster given that in the aftermath of a disaster 
the need for food, clothing and medicines is similar across households. A couple of studies on 
the relief allocation following Hurricane Mitch in affected countries in Central America found 
that that targeting was primarily based on the size of asset losses experienced by households 
and much less on the level of pre-hurricane vulnerability of households (Wodon and Morris, 
2003; Ambler 2005).  
The modality of food aid is likely to have differentiated implications for reaching the 
desired group of population and for impacting the welfare indicator (usually nutritional status) 
that the intervention aims for. In particular, several studies have found that food-for-work 
seems to accomplish a better targeting towards asset-poor households as compared to 
community-based targeting or free distribution (Quisumbing, 2003; Barrett and Lentz, 2005). 
Since food aid is almost always post hoc with few rules and difficult knowledge 
about how much will come and who will get the aid, the key issues for food aid management 
programs would be: good targeting methods; appropriate timing for food aid flows making 
them countercyclical, launched as early as possible and budgeted on a physical not monetary 
basis; aligned with positive incentives such as other factor prices (seed, fertilizer, assets) and 
labour supply; appropriate assessment of the best procurement modalities, such that if there is 
sufficient food available nearby to fill the gaps the provision of food should base on local 
purchases and triangular transactions or otherwise carry intercontinental shipments to bring 
food aid; known and consistent schedule of assistance to help recipients to plan consumption 
and investment; and finally find an adequate balance of food aid with cash: the use of food aid 
should only come if a problem of food availability and market failures underpin the lack of 
access to food. On the contrary, if local markets are functioning well then cash transfers or 
jobs to targeted recipients should be provided (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005; IFPRI/WFP, 
2005). 
 
Cash or Food? 
In practice, very often cash and in-kind transfers should be combined to suit the different 
circumstances that arise as a result of the program objectives, market assessments
7, timing of 
distribution (i.e., seasonality in rural areas), institutional capacity requirements and 
beneficiary preferences. For instance, participants in a real-time self-evaluation of the 
drought-relief programme implemented in southern Zambia in 2005/06 appreciated the fact 
that both cash transfers, food, and inputs were delivered to the most vulnerable people 
affected by crop failure and in different contexts: cash transfers going into areas with 
functioning markets where the traders could respond to an increase in effective demand and 
food-based transfers going into areas with low  stocks and weak market performance (WFP, 
2006).  
Similar conclusions came from a couple of market assessments and trader surveys 
following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan: A Save the Children study in urban conglomerates 
found that business in food shops went down by 70-80% on pre-earthquake levels due to the 
loss of income of buyers and the lack of demand for food due to provision of in-kind relief. 
On the other hand, food prices increased around 15-20% in villages, with the most remote  
 
10
being worst affected. The solution devised was to reactivate markets as quickly as possible 
with support for reconstruction and credit to shopkeepers going hand-in-hand with a phased 
increase in the provision of cash transfers rather than in-kind aid (Save the Children, 2006). 
This conclusion was echoed by a WFP study in the most food-insecure areas of Pakistan 
which concluded that food assistance in urban areas would be likely to hinder market 
recovery, and thus food aid distributions were retargeted to rural areas (Hoskins, 2006; 
Donovan et al, 2005). 
In short, it is the combination of the type of climate shock (i.e., slow onset events: 
droughts versus rapid onset events: earthquake, hurricane or tsunami), its impact, and various 
ex ante conditions, including institutional capacities at different government levels and the 
situation of markets which should determine the appropriate mix of cash/food responses to 
emergency disasters caused by climate shocks. 
And yet, an effective food and cash transfer programme would be the last layer of 
response to a humanitarian emergency. Public interventions at an earlier point could be 
sufficient to prevent the initial shock, say a drought or flood, escalating towards a famine. 
A ‘first best’ solution could be to prevent subsistence crises from occurring at all by investing 
in agricultural technology, building transport infrastructure to integrate markets, and building 
asset buffers at the household level to reduce their vulnerability. A ‘second best’ solution 
would be to strengthen insurance mechanisms against the impacts of weather shocks, 
including employment guarantee schemes as a form of insurance or weather-based insurance 
as will be explained later. The point being that if formal transfers mobilised in the aftermath 
of a climate shock including food aid and cash transfers are being promoted as a panacea, to 
the neglect of policies that strengthen production, build markets and infrastructure, or provide 
effective insurance against livelihood shocks the underlying conditions of precariousness 
could remain (Devereux, 2006). 
 
Should governments focus on ex ante strategies? 
A gradual shift from the traditional emergency relief towards ex ante actions to reduce and 
mitigate climate risks in the developing world should be encouraged. First and most 
obviously natural disasters are the antithesis of development. They bring irreversible 
damages, including death and destruction, sometimes of long-run gains, and seriously 
jeopardize asset recovery of human and physical assets.  
A second aspect to consider is that adopting ex ante strategies could de facto enhance 
wellbeing and reduce poverty making households more resilient to hardships. Dealing with 
risk and insecurity is central to the way poor develop their livelihood strategies. A case could 
be made both in terms of efficiency and equity grounds. On equity terms the poor should be 
supported against the need to deplete their hard-earned assets. In terms of efficiency, 
insurance could also allow the poor to engage in more risky activities and bring higher returns 
(Dercon, et al. 2006). Safety nets might achieve equity, but not necessarily efficiency. 
An empirical study of rural Zimbabwean households tracked over seven years (1992-
1997) with a drought episode in the midst (1994/5) compares the income effect of the 
observed ex post public responses to drought (grain loans) against the effect of a 
counterfactual ex ante intervention two years prior to the shock (provision of capital and 
extension services). After developing an empirical model in which capital and extension 
services increase net crop incomes that in turn increase holdings of agricultural tools and 
livestock without crowding out private transfers, the value of the assistance transferred to 
households in the form of grain loans is reallocated into households in the form of capital and 
extension services to run a series of counterfactuals. Doing so reduces poverty in non-drought 
years and at the same time allows households to build up buffer stock to protect against the 
potential drought or other impacts (Owens, et al., 2003). Incidentally, additional livestock 
only reduced marginally the impact of the drought in income terms, but it might have assisted 
positively children anthropometric measures as related studies on this same group of 
households have shown (Hoddinott and Kinsley, 2001). 
It could be argued that despite the attractiveness of anticipating to climate shocks 
there are limited resources and capacities as well as other development short-term priorities.  
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However, even under pure economic considerations, the rising economic cost of disasters, for 
instance El Nino and global warming, and the acknowledgment that aid will never cover more 
than a small fraction of the cost of disasters should spur the adoption of ex ante measures. For 
instance, from a number of studies that have assessed the relative costs and benefits of individual 
disaster risk reduction initiatives it has been found that for every dollar invested in pre-disaster 
risk management activities between two and four dollars are returned in terms of avoided or 
reduced disaster impacts (DFID, 2006).
8 
Ex ante actions can take place at different levels: disaster preparedness through solid 
analytical frameworks and information systems can be implemented nationwide. At the 
community level disaster management initiatives, including training programs and social 
funds, should be strengthened. Both sets of actions should complement the provision of 
incentives to individual and household units to adopt risk-prone activities that can bring 
higher returns and a more diversified asset base.   
 
 Disaster  Preparedness 
Preparedness can play a huge role in the effectiveness of natural disasters management 
strategies. This is usually conceived as the set of activities and measures taken before hazard 
events occur to forecast and warn against them, evacuate people and property when they 
threaten and ensure effective response (e.g., stockpiling food supplies). It consists of planning 
and institutional development.  
On the planning side efforts concentrate on good analytical frameworks
9 and 
information systems to understand what disasters entail for those who experience them and 
stimulate a critical reflection on the best initiatives to deal with them. For example, early 
warning systems can help to monitor natural hazards, plan response activities, identify 
affected populations and their needs, assess the flexibility of existing instruments or the 
functioning of markets or facilitate targeting of beneficiaries. For example, prior to Hurricane 
Mitch the communities along the Coyolate River in Guatemala had undertaken a joint flood 
map, established a high-rainfall alarm system and had constructed evacuation shelters. The 
result was that the impact of the Hurricane was substantially reduced upon the inhabitants and 
there was no loss of life (DFID, 2006). Risk mapping activities can be greatly enhanced by 
recent developments on the collection of natural disasters data via new risk modules that have 
been developed and are widely integrated in household surveys as well as recent advances in 
poverty mapping techniques that have improved the identification of vulnerable populations 
(Vakis, 2006). A major advantage derived from this exercises would be acting upon 
relocating those inhabiting very high-risk locations. When resettlement is not feasible or 
desirable (i.e., the incentives for the poor to abandon risk-prone areas are not in place), 
governments can help them to upgrade and invest in dwelling and community infrastructure. 
This might involve a number of community-based disaster management approaches, such as 
undertaking socio-economic projects, including drainage works in urban areas to reduce 
people’s vulnerability. 
Investing in institutional preparedness has proven to be the other priority in disaster 
preparedness, especially at the local level where destruction of road networks and lack of 
transport could leave communities in isolation for several days. Training activities for 
preparing communities for disasters include paralegal training, specialised topics on 
community organising, evacuation management, emergency response, health and sanitation, 
environmental education and simulation exercises. For example, there were no deaths in La 
Masica on the coast of Honduras, where external agencies, including UNDP, had supported a local 
capacity-building programme for risk reduction featuring a community-based flood early warning 
system linked to preparedness training (1996-98). 
A key feature for successful investing in local capacity is to work with pre-existing 
forms of organization within communities. In Nicaragua, a hazard-prone country, NGOs 
working in disaster preparedness have concentrated most of their efforts on community 
organisation and have achieved their greatest successes in this area.
10 Several organisations 
that have been working in disaster-affected areas for many years have created and trained 
their own networks of promoters to help them channel aid more quickly and effectively, often  
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relying on pre-existing structures in the communities. That is the case with the rural 
community committees that assume the title of emergency committees when they act to 
manage natural disasters. Similarly, in certain zones, particularly those most affected by the 
armed conflict of the 1980s there is already an installed and consolidated organizational 
capacity that enables the local population to tackle different climate shocks successfully. The 
extent of these capacities was demonstrated during Hurricane Mitch in 1998 in the conflict-
affected municipalities of Wiwilí and Jalapa, for example, were evacuation was done rapidly 
and the mobilisation of provisions and organisation of emergency shelters was very effective. 
Training for institutional development related to disaster preparedness was managed by both 
community development experts and from other coming from a relief or civil defence 
background. The methodology employed was often a combination of participatory methods 
together with hierarchal civil defence-style approaches. This blend of local ownership and 
awareness combined with relief skills and predetermined chains of command turned out quite 
effective in practice (Christoplos, 2001). 
 
Social Funds 
Social funds are a suitable place for the emergence of community-based disaster management 
strategies. They allow poor people to become actively involved in the development of their 
communities by supporting small projects ranging from infrastructure and social services to 
training and micro‐enterprise development identified by the communities. They are typically 
managed by a wide range of actors, including local governments, NGOs, line ministries, 
community groups and local project committees (Vakis, 2006). 
Social funds have demonstrated to be amongst the most flexible and innovative 
instruments to deal with natural disasters (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2006). A number of 
factors explain this situation. First, they are apt to respond rapidly in the aftermath of natural 
disaster due to simplified administrative procedures, good management and operational 
autonomy. Additionally, public responses are likely to be more effective if they are based on 
programs and mechanisms that are in place before the shock occurs. The preparation of 
contingency manuals ahead of time as has been done in the hurricane prone country Saint 
Lucia is a case in point. During shocks the constraints to act increase due to scarcity of fiscal 
resources, the lack or weakness of institutional capacity to respond quickly, and the lack of 
instruments and information problems. Social fund are usually beforehand in areas affected 
by climate shocks facilitating immediate action in concert with municipal governments and 
other agencies to prioritize and implement projects where most needed. If there are pre-
established links with communities and local leaders as noted earlier, that could guarantee 
community participation at all stages of the project cycle and facilitate effective targeting. 
Finally, social funds can also be used as a channelling devise to direct relief from donors. 
This can be especially crucial during the crucial first hours or days of a natural disaster. 
The usefulness of social funds can go beyond the satisfaction of short‐term needs. 
They can also facilitate the recovery and rehabilitation process of affected communities 
through the reconstruction of basic infrastructure such as sanitation, education, and health 
facilities. In fact, reconstruction and rehabilitation are ideal openings for starting a process of 
learning and reflecting about risk and then applying these lessons in decisions of what, how 
and with whom to rebuild. The immediate post-disaster period is the obvious time to entrench 
measures to prepare for and mitigate the next disaster. However, this does not always work. 
Development polemics may displace concerns about risk and the rush to move money may  
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discourage taking the time to analyse risk and integrate such analysis in reconstruction 
planning, even in seemingly self-evident areas such as housing (Frühling, 2001). 
Finally, many of the social funds projects are labor intensive by nature; hence they 
can benefit communities by creating temporary jobs through workfare program at critical 
times when normal sources of income and employment had been badly disrupted. For 
example, the social fund in Honduras approved 2100 projects within 100 days of Hurricane 
Mitch; the speed of implementation was four times pre-Mitch averages. This helped to restore 
infrastructure, but also created employment in a manner not dissimilar to workfare programs, 
such as Argentina’s Trabajar (Alderman and Haque, 2006). At the same time, choices made 
following a disaster could have long-term implications. For instance, the presence of social 
funds could end up influencing and informing decisions regarding longer term developmental 
objectives, such as beneficiary ownership and accountability for maintenance of civil works 
constructed (Vakis, 2006). 
At the macro level as well, more recently conceived initiatives are the Calamity 
Funds in countries like Mexico, India, and the Philippines which are reserve budgetary funds 
which can be accessed to avoid the need for sudden borrowing or disruption of development 
plans after a disaster, without restriction (unlike many aid flows and insurance). In addition, 
bigger microfinance organizations like Grameen Bank in Bangladesh are setting aside a part 
of their funds for meeting the contingencies of natural disasters. International financing 
mechanisms for direct budgetary support to affected countries can also mitigate the impact of 
disasters on foreign exchange or fiscal budgets. In this regard, one of the main instruments to 
respond to the financing of imports following a shock has been the IMF’s compensatory 
financing facility (CFF), and more recently the poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) 
which allows countries to borrow money for cushioning a shock while deferring repayments 
(Alderman and Haque, 2006). 
 
Microfinance 
Governments and other actors can also enhance the adoption of preventive measures against 
natural disasters at the micro-level. Given that asset-based self-insurance mechanisms seems 
insufficient for most households, the alternative courses of action devised are to provide 
households with safer assets and/or to avoid asset-based risk management strategies at all and 
focus on the provision of credit for productive purposes and insurance products.  
  Micro Financial Institutions (MFIs) can assist their clients long before a natural 
disaster strikes and continue long after the event has passed. Pre-disaster activities would 
include adapting current lending and compulsory savings products, home improvement loans; 
leasing assets; providing money transfer services; as well as  insurance and voluntary savings 
and non-financial services such as training for disasters. 
To date, very few MFIs have taken the path of disaster preparedness activities or 
products. On the financial side, loans to encourage diversification into disaster-proof activities 
or safer housing are still rare. Other products which include efforts to link loan clients to 
institutions that can provide voluntary savings or remittances are also uncommon. Lines-of-
credit and remittance services are only now appearing in the microfinance world. The most 
comprehensive efforts to help clients in risk reduction and mitigation activities have taken 
place in Bangladesh, where some of the large institutions such as Proshika and the 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA) actually started as relief organizations. In fact, 
Bangladeshi MFIs have led the industry in insurance, credit, and savings services, and have 
also taken the lead in loans for disaster-proof housing, as well as in small emergency loans 
and larger asset replacement loans. 
Emergency relief in the immediate aftermath as well as recovery efforts or long-term 
post-disaster rehabilitation would comprise carrying out rapid portfolio reviews; restructuring 
and writing-off loans; switching from group-based liability to individual liability during the 
disaster; providing emergency loans; allowing withdrawal of forced savings; modifying loan 
product terms; and providing non-financial emergency services. 
Yet again, in terms of disaster response, only a few of the larger, better-capitalized, 
and regulated MFIs have been able to match their post-disaster services to the preferred  
 
14
coping mechanisms requested by their clients. Specifically, these MFIs have provided their 
clients with post-disaster savings and loan services making them less likely to resort to 
distress sales of assets after disaster strikes (Brown and Nagarajan, 2000). Unfortunately, very 
few MFIs have the institutional structure or capital base required to provide these services  
―microfinance remains primarily a credit-based activity and most institutions are 




It is safe to assert that providing households with more and better assets in terms of their 
divisibility and value-holding properties in times of stress should help them to deal better with 
natural disasters. The best possible alternative for households to adopt assets insensitive to 
price and survival risks (i.e., livestock) brought about by climate shocks are low-cost saving 
accounts. This financial asset is highly divisible and could maintain a fixed value and positive 
returns all at once during a regional drought for instance (World Bank, 2001; Morduch, 
1999).  
Savings can allow households to avoid borrowing from moneylenders that could 
charge high interest rates when emergency funds are needed and can be especially valuable 
during a crisis. The most well documented example of demand for access to compulsory 
savings comes from the Bangladesh flood of 1998. Grameen Bank reported that 95 percent of 
compulsory savings were withdrawn during the massive 1998 flood, while 67 percent of 
BRAC clients withdrew more than half of their compulsory savings. (Rapid-Onset Natural 
Disasters Technical Briefs: Using Compulsory Savings for Natural Disaster Response) 
However, replenishing these savings proved challenging. By 2000 only half of the 660,000 
clients of BRAC in Bangladesh who withdrew compulsory savings during the 1998 flood had 
re-deposited these funds (Pantoja, 2002). 
Surprisingly, there appears to be limited evidence on the promotion of savings for 
precautionary purposes against climatic -shocks in general (Dercon 2005). Clients know that 
larger savings deposits within micro-finance institutions mean access to larger loans. 
Therefore, most saving instruments still appear to be mostly used as means for developing 
reputation and commitment for accessing micro-credit. 
Overall, some of the keys to success of savings programs rest in the provision of 
long-term security and convenience, hedge against inflation, minimize costs, and relend 
deposits safely but profitably (Morduch, 1999).  
 
Credit 
An alternative route to limit the asset-based risk management strategies of households is to 
provide access to credit. This seems a more convenient and widespread mechanism to help 
the poor protect themselves. 
Households use loans in a number of ways. One channel is the asset-creation 
associated with a series of loan-financed investments. A household who has taken several 
loans would typically have focussed its asset building on the creation or expansion of one or 
more income-earning assets and would also have invested in improving housing conditions. A 
second channel would be to smooth income flows rather than consumption. In rural areas this 
occurs through the creation of non-farm sources of income as well as by saving part of the 
loan disbursed for the lean season. In urban areas this takes place through investing in home-
based enterprises. This could have both direct and indirect effects on the household’s 
resilience against weather vagaries. The accumulation of assets and income could lead to an 
increase in savings as well allow some employment diversification reducing the exposure to 
risk (Dercon 2005).  
However, caution is necessary when assuming that credit-driven asset-creation will 
automatically reduce vulnerability as returns to assets would still face the usual difficulties 
associated with the covariance of climate shocks. In addition, income diversification would 
not always be effective, especially in rural areas where diversification takes place by getting 
involved in non-agricultural activities and engaging in local farm wage employment, among  
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other ways, but the spatial distribution of farm and non-farm activities alike is often limited 
(Morduch 1995; Dercon 2005). A study of farmer responses to drought in Burkina Faso 
between 1981 and 1985 showed that non-farm income was positively correlated with crop 
income in the presence of the drought. This was consistent with Sen’s analysis of famines 
where a crop failure sometimes leads to a collapse in demand for local services and crafts, 
limiting the capacity of this other professions to compensate the drop in incomes (Fafchamps, 
et al. 1998). 
The more traditional constraint of working capital needed to enter into nonfarm 
business in rural areas or informal activities in urban areas would be covered by credit. By 
doing so, credit could become a highly priced instrument for reducing vulnerability, 
especially facilitating the adoption of risk mitigating strategies. For instance, in the aftermath 
of the 1998 floods in Bangladesh households served by several MFIs institutions were aware 
that the most resounding effect that access to credit brought to them was in terms of planning 
income-diversification activities for mitigating risk. Hence as clients were aware of this 
benefit they continued to repay loans during and after the flood so that the credit sources 
remained open for them in the aftermath (Zamman, 1999).  
Paradoxically, the degree to which credit can help to cope with disasters depends not 
only on having access to it, but also on the circumstances under which households can resort 
to it. The same assessment of the role of micro-credit during the 1998 floods in Bangladesh 
through one of the largest micro-credit providers in that country illustrates how in the 
immediate aftermath of the natural disaster, many micro-finance organizations –BRAC along 
with Tangail and SafeSave– turned into de-facto relief agencies and delivered post-disaster 
rehabilitation assistance, in terms of both financial and other services. For instance, BRAC 
provided several non-financial emergency services to the flood victims. These included 
disease control measures, seeds to farmers and input replacement for other economic 
activities. They also helped repair schools and basic infrastructure (Sebstad and Cohen, 2000). 
BRAC also purchased 364 tons of rice on the open market and sold it at subsidized rates to 
clients (Pantoja, 2002). However, membership in BRAC’s credit program offered only partial 
insurance to flood-affected households. Despite having access to their savings all three 
different organizations reported low withdrawal rates in affected regions and households 
resorted to a wide variety of coping mechanisms including cutting down the number of meals. 
This was due to physical inaccessibility to local branches, but also because the clients desired 
to keep larger savings deposits within the MFIs as a means to access larger loans (Zamman, 
1999).
11 If asking for credit for food consumption is perceived to compromise long-term 
prospects household might be willing to avoid so. They should not be confronted against this 
sort of dilemmas. This brings an anticipated policy conclusion: micro-credit may be a more 
effective remedy against vulnerability if it is complemented with other interventions, say a 
micro-credit cum food-relief program. 
The revealed preference for savings and especially micro-credit as the main engine 
for accumulating assets as a way to diversify economic activities and exposure to risks rather 
than for consumption smoothing purposes reaffirms the fact that policy responses should give 
priority to risk mitigation strategies over coping. 
An additional measure that could strengthen the effectiveness of micro-credit programs is 
to combine microcredit with saving and insurance products. The linkage of credit with 
insurance products would allow households not to take out loans to cope with transitory 
emergencies, but to accumulate productive assets that could be destined to income-mitigating 
activities without having to worry about short-term needs. Simultaneously, as disaster risk 
poses a risk to the operation of MFIs the provision of insurance could guarantee loan 
repayments by poor households., Proshika, one of the largest NGOs and MFIs in the world 
with more than two million clients in Bangladesh, offers a savings scheme to rural and poor 
urban households. As a result of wide-scale defaults in the massive 1988 floods, this scheme 
introduced since 1997 compulsory group-based insurance proving to be relatively effective 
until today. Under this program 2% of the savings balance is annually transferred to a fund 
that will pay twice the amount of the savings deposit in the case of property damage due to 
disasters, while savings stay intact. In the life policy component, a minimum of twice the  
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savings balance will be paid out, depending on the number of years of membership of the 
savings scheme (the outstanding loan will be recovered) (Pantoja, 2002).  
It is also increasingly recognized that microfinance can play a role in large-scale 
disasters by offering emergency loans, housing loans and asset replacement loans; by 
allowing loan forgiveness/ rescheduling in the areas affected by disasters, better targeting of 
relief programs through established microfinance networks, better flow of information among 
the clientele of microfinance organizations, and through the empowerment of women and 
their capacity to build social capital. But the main challenges for micro-finance remain the 
potentially high transaction costs that could arise from reaching areas with low population 
densities and targeting families with non-diversified income sources; and the need for 
credibility of the institution (Morduch, 1999). 
 
Insurance 
Only 1% and 3% of households and businesses in low- and middle-income countries, 
respectively, have catastrophe insurance coverage, compared with 30% in high-income 
countries (Provention 2005). A recent review of micro-insurance schemes
12 providing 
coverage for disaster risks enumerates four aspects that will determine their viability for 
managing climate shocks. These criteria include the contribution of micro-insurance to risk 
reduction, the financial robustness of the schemes, their affordability, and their governance 
(Mechler et al., 2006).  
 
   Contribution to risk reduction 
Insurance alone or linked to credit can allow households to adopt higher-return activities and 
thus reduce their exposure to risk. The evidence in this respect is still very limited, and to date 
there is no clear evidence of the relationship between micro-insurance and shifts to higher-
risk/higher-yield activities either through bundling insurance with credit loans or standing 
alone (Gine et al., 2006). One of the few ongoing natural-experiment program evaluations 
that looks at take-up and possible impact of a new rainfall insurance scheme offered to 
smallholder farmers in the Andhra Pradesh region of southern India offers a mixed picture in 
this respect.
13 On the one hand, there was an unanticipated high take-up of insurance for both 
2004 and 2005 main crop seasons mainly for security reasons (exposure to rain or large 
cultivation of castor or groundnut which are more profitable than other crops, but also more 
sensitive to droughts). However, no change on household behaviour (labour supply, input 
usage, area devoted to cash crops, savings or consumption, etc) was observed in response to 
insurance purchases. These results are preliminary and most likely indicate that as households 
in the sample are purchasing insurance for the first time they might still be experimenting 
with it.
14  
Insurance can also contribute to reduce risk by helping households to recover fast 
from a disaster. Substantial compensation can be provided post-disaster as a result of 
insurance or if the compensation forthcoming reaches beneficiaries quickly the recovery can 
be facilitated. For instance, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India started 
providing health, property, and life insurance to its clients since 1992. After the earthquake in 
2001 and floods in 2003-04 in Gujarat the insured received payouts for the loss equipment 
and huts that enable them to quickly restore their livelihood and return to income-generating 
activities. Similarly, WINCROP (Windward Islands Crop Insurance) program established in 
1998 by the banana marketing organizations of Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Lucia 
offers insurance against windstorms affecting banana crops in any on the four countries. By 
statute, WINCROP is required to settle claims within 38 days of the storm date. Until 2004, 
267 events have been settled and even though payout is limited, the quick access to cash is 
reported to have helped farmers to re-establish their situation relatively quickly (Mechler et 
al. 2006).  
It has been assumed that although disaster insurance might not be fully conceived a 
mitigation strategy per se –as it redistributes rather than reduces losses–, a well designed 
insurance program should promote the adoption of loss reduction measures by insurees. A 
recent review of micro-insurance schemes in Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan and  
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the Caribbean countries of Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Lucia found, however, that 
none of these schemes fully equates premiums to risk, nor offers reduced premiums based on 
the adoption of preventive measures or collects any extra-premiums for a risk-mitigation fund 
Obviously, for poor segments of the population the additional administrative costs involved 
would make disaster-insurance inaccessible, but it remains to see whether such instruments 
can help to reduce the vulnerability and risk-exposure of households through their inbuilt 
incentives (Mechler et al., 2006).  
 
Financial robustness 
During climate shocks, once risk is transferred from small farmers to a local insurance 
provider the risk cannot be reduced further by pooling because of the high covariance of 
rainfall and other climatic factors across regions and countries.
15 There has to be some 
mechanism to transfer the risk out of the region or country for the provider to be willing to 
offer insurance. Otherwise, disaster insurers face the possibility of very large losses and even 
insolvency when the events that affect entire communities or regions have a high-impact.  
Even though reinsurance is essential to keep the costs of disaster insurance provision 
low, there are no global reinsurance facilities for insuring weather in developing countries – 
some of the reasons could be that primary insurers in many cases lack the scale and 
sophistication to appeal international reinsurers who could also make more money in the US 
market which is heavily subsidized (Morduch; 2006; World Bank, 2005). The same review of 
micro-insurance schemes in Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan and the Caribbean 
countries of Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Lucia found that indeed with the 
exception of index-based weather schemes in Malawi and India and WINCROP in the 
Caribbean the rest of the schemes involved little reinsurance (Mechler et al., 2006).  
One solution is the government: their deep credit capacity as the largest credit entity 
in the country makes governments a natural candidate to pool risk and then facilitate risk 
transfer. Government risk pooling is also a good strategy to bring down the premium paid by 
reducing the transaction costs associated with the risk transfer. Alternatively, instead of 
pooling risk themselves governments can design index reinsurance contracts for catastrophic 
risks and transfer them to international capital markets. This would mean that the government 
reinsures itself through international capital markets.  
The experience of the current national insurance system for the rural sector in Mexico 
is illustrative in this respect. The system consists of Agroasemex, the state-owned insurance 
company established in 1990, the Fondos de Aseguramiento, or Insurance Funds, and private 
insurance companies.
16  Between 2003 and 2005, 1.5 million hectares have been insured using 
this scheme, scattered among 186 weather stations, with a sum insured of 88.1 million dollars, 
premiums for 13.3 million dollars and indemnities for 10.5 million dollars. International risk 
transference began in 2004 placing the risk under quota share and excess of loss reinsurance 
schemes. This risk transfer process involves a very strong participation of international 
reinsurance in the mitigation of the costs of damaging events and has allowed Agroasemex in 
2006 to expand its protection to a surface of 2.3 million hectares related to 237 weather 
stations, a sum insured of 131.9 million dollars and premiums for 17.3 million dollars 
(Agroasemex, 2006). 
The other important feature for achieving financial robustness in insurance 
mechanisms is the adoption of a partner-agent model which has been identified as the most 
financially sustainable mechanism through which insurance products could be offered to the 
poor as it allows each of the parties involved to focus on its strengths. The partner is an 
established insurer with experience and interest in broadening its insurance portfolio and the 
agent are likely to be financial institutions with close contacts with lower-income segments of 
the market, including grassroots organizations and NGOs (Dercon et al., 2006). Most disaster 
micro-insurers are operating as partner-agents in fact (Mechler et al., 2006).  
Within the agent-partner model there is also great scope for government intervention, 
but not through direct provision. Insurance purchasers appear less likely to take precautions 
and even default on loans when the government acts as insurer and governments tend to 
tolerate defaults for the sake of political expediency (Morduch, 1999). For these reasons, the  
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government can foster a pro-poor insurance scheme creating a favourable policy environment 
(i.e., facilitating establishment of Micro-Financial Institutions (MFIs) and making more 
attractive the provision of insurance to established insurers). In this case, government 
involvement is not about large scale subsidies, but rather about establishing necessary 
infrastructure, institutions and regulatory environment (Morduch 1999, Dercon et al. 2006). 
For instance, since 2000 the Indian regulatory authority has made it mandatory for formal 
insurance providers to service the low-income segment of society. Furthermore, there is a 
provision that regulated insurers must increase their shares of low-income clients over time. 
Insurers wishing to operate in India are fined for noncompliance and appear willing to incur a 
loss on their low-income micro-insurance business in order to access the broader market.  
Insurers have thus made insurance affordable (lower premiums) for the poor communities 
with cross-subsidies from their other lines of business and wealthier clients (Mechler et al., 
2006). 
   The international donor community can also play an important role to ensure 
financial sustainability by aggregating and pooling risk from different developing countries to 
allow for improved pricing and risk transfer into the global reinsurance and capital markets. 
The Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF) under preparation by the World Bank and the 




Insurance markets are usually incomplete or missing due to asymmetric information and high 
transaction costs, but in agriculture for example this situation is compounded as the events 
that bring risk are infrequent and covariate.
18 All this problems eventually translate into a 
higher premium charge making insurance unaffordable to low-income clients. The high costs 
associated with the verification process of settling claims on a case-by-case basis after 
weather events is what made crop insurance  -the traditional agricultural insurance risk 
strategy followed by governments- to fail (Hess and Syroka, 2005).
19 
For developing countries, one recent innovation seems to be particularly promising to 
mitigate some of these problems. The idea is to supply insurance based on weather indexes 
(i.e., insure the source of loss) rather than losses themselves. In doing so, the trigger event for 
payment is exogenous to the individual policyholder –could be area yield-level, 
rainfall/temperature, winds, earthquake magnitude, hurricane trajectories, vegetative indices– 
but has a strong correlation with the losses. Therefore verification is straightforward as there 
is no need to carry on-site inspections or individual loss assessments. This makes deductibles 
and copayments less needed and insurance in general easy to administer and more affordable. 
In addition, there is no need to restrict the amount of individual purchases as contracts and 
indemnity payments are the same for everyone per unit of insurance (World Bank, 2005).  
If the expansion of coverage demonstrates the affordability of weather-based 
insurance products, the experience of the current national insurance system for the rural sector 
in Mexico would also be illustrative in this respect. After proving the conceptual and 
methodological soundness of introducing a index-based insurance by means of a pilot test in 
2002,
20  a  scheme to hedge the weather catastrophic exposure of agriculture was formally 
launched in 2003 in one state of Mexico (Guanajuato) being the first commercial weather 
index insurance applied to the rural sector (sanctioned by a local regulator). For the 2006 
spring-summer cycle, with the most mature index insurance program worldwide from a 
technical perspective, the program will offer coverage to 2.3 million hectares, associated to 
297 weather stations scattered across the 32 states of the country (Agroasemex, 2006; Ibarra, 
2003, 2006). Yet, part of the relative success of the system is due to its focus on the highly 
productive and financially viable sector of commercial agriculture (the covered surface only 
represents 28 percent of the un-irrigated crop surface). Subsistence and poor non-commercial 
farmers are covered through the government’s national disaster scheme called Fonden.
21 
The scope of the Mexican rural productive safety net holds strong parallels with the 
other mostly publicised index-based crop insurance schemes launched in India in 2003 whose 
coverage now extends to about 250,000 clients, without being directly subsidized. Yet, these 
schemes are mostly offered to farmers taking loans that will increase their productivity; thus,  
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there may be a bias toward more affluent rural farmers. Indeed, a couple of cases where 
index-based products have been introduced the premiums can be substantial. In Malawi where 
micro-lending coupled with mandatory crop insurance was introduced in November 2005, 
farmers pay from 6 to 10% of their insured crop values; in India in the BASIX scheme 
farmers pay up to 3% (Mechler, et al. 2006). In the impact evaluation of the BASIX 
microinsurance project it was found that only 7% of buyers cited low premium as the driving 
force to get insurance well below security reasons (40%), but is also true that the growing 
uptake of voluntary contracts under this scheme might indicate their affordability.  
Perhaps a more worrying aspect is that take-up rates increased in household wealth 
and membership to CBOs -members of a borewell user association was the single most 
important determinant of whether household purchase insurance (Giné, et al., 2006). The 
influence of both aspects – wealth and social networks on insurance participation outcomes 
could have negative distributional effects: if rainfall insurance is only purchased by wealthier 
households, then those households may have additional income to bid up the price of local 
non-traded goods during periods of drought, making non-purchasers worse off. In addition 
formal rainfall insurance may undermine existing risk-sharing mechanisms, by raising the 
threat point of households who seek to withdraw from implicit risk sharing arrangements 
(Morduch, 2006). In addition, providing more insurance can remove the risk of worsening 
poverty or poverty traps, but it would not resolve the initial inequality that might exist across 
the beneficiary communities. In this sense, insurance is not substitute for redistribution and 
any insurance scheme should remain vigilant of not exacerbating any embedded inequalities 
(Fafchamps, 2006). 
Weather-based index contracts can have other uses beyond insurance. They can serve 
as contingent ex ante funding for government disaster relief and safety net policies and to 
provide reinsurance for the private or government as in the Mexican case. Current funding for 
emergency activities in food insecure countries is based on an appeals-based system that 
delivers food well after the crop failures and weather shocks with the consequence that by this 
time people may have already sold productive assets and/or migrated. Providing ex ante 
funding would give more certainty and timelier provision of assistance. Under the same logic 
that index-based insurance is triggered by the source of loss, funding can become available 
well before the loss actually manifests and payments could be distributed early to districts 
affected by a contingency (say a drought) to scale up the existing safety nets based on where 
the rainfall measures indicate where shortfalls will occur. Once in the district, communities 
are expected to use local knowledge to allocate the quota of assistance received or some 
proxy means targeting to the household would be used to determine which individuals should 
receive the payment. This is, for instance, how the World Food Program (WFP) uses existing 
vulnerability assessments (Alderman and Haque, 2006). The other advantage with rainfall 
data as a trigger to social protection programs is that it remains a form of dynamic geographic 
targeting that bases allocations on area of residence making it suitable for covariate shocks. It 
is the case that more than one targeting modality is often used while implementing a counter-
cyclical safety net.  
Although rainfall during the 2005 monsoon season in Andrah Pradesh was normal, 
farmers under the BASIX insurance scheme received a payout because of a delay in rainfall 
that affected sowing time. Claims were quickly serviced within 15 days of the end of the 
policy period, which contrasted with the 12–18 months for the national crop insurance 
scheme with its conventional loss inspection and settling (Mechler, et al., 2006). A similar 
thing is expected from the strategy implemented by the Ethiopian government in the last 
couple of years to provide food security to its population. In January 2005 a productive safety 
net was introduced in an effort to change the vulnerability profile of the chronically poor. In 
addition, as part of this ex-ante risk-management system to protect the livelihoods of 
Ethiopians vulnerable to severe and catastrophic weather risks, the government started to pilot 
in 2006 an index-based insurance to fund emergency relief operations in the event of a well-
defined rainfall deficit at harvest time. It is estimated that this insurance approach would 
allow interventions four months earlier than the traditional appeals-based system (WFP, 2005; 
World Bank, 2005).  
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The attractiveness of weather-indexed insurance is reflected in the explosion of pilot 
projects in countries as diverse as Ukraine, India, Malawi, Nicaragua, Peru, Ethiopia, China, 
and Thailand. However, only since 2005 a systematic approach for scaling up their design, 
implementation, operation and evaluation has been taking place. Therefore given the limited 
scale of the pilot programs to date it is premature to draw definitive conclusions on the 
performance and impact of weather insurance.  
Moreover, there are cases where index insurance might be inappropriate. By design, 
the correlation between the index measure and local outputs (i.e., yields) needs to be high, but 
this could not happen in places where agricultural commodities are grown in microclimates 
with large differences in weather patterns within a few miles (World Bank 2005). More 
fundamentally, rainfall stations might simply not be there or have low quality and insufficient 
data  in regions with low potential and limited commercial farming interests. Finally, the 
sustainability of the scheme could be compromised by weather cycles that change the 
probability of the insured events, most notably rainfall and temperature. In this regard, 
phenomena as El Niño or global warming are especially relevant as they are not yet fully 
understood (Dercon, et al. 2006). All three factors combined can create a potential mismatch 
between index triggered payouts and actual losses, even if this are substantial (basis risk). 
This problem is not insurmountable, but certainly takes time to collect better data and more 
generally to develop a scheme of this nature. In Nicaragua, for instance, rainfall insurance 
was first seriously considered in 1998, but the pilot was just introduced seven years later in 
early 2005 (World Bank, 2005). 
Another alternative for national governments and/or the international donor 
community to make insurance affordable is to co-finance insurance purchasing with premium 
subsidies or reimbursing primary insurers for administrative or product development costs or 
even providing reinsurance below market premium rates. For instance, donor assistance to the 
disaster insurance program – Afat Vimo – offered since 2004 by the NGO, All India Disaster 
Mitigation Institute (AIDMI), to cover households and micro-businesses in the state of 
Gujarat has kept the premiums in one of the cities Bhuj at about at about 0.5% of annual 
income (the cost of a box of matches per day).  
In addition, as noted before, governments can bring down premium costs for the poor 
without large scale subsidies, but establishing a pro-poor regulatory environment. Take the  
disaster insurance program in Gujarat as a relevant case again: because of the pro-poor 
regulatory requirements in India, premiums have been kept low and affordable as confirmed 
by a survey conducted before the start of the scheme. It is estimated that by 2004 about 12% 
of the poor in Bhuj, the worst affected city by the 2001 earthquake, were covered (Aysan, 
2005).  
But because of the disincentives and distortions that direct subsidies can bring about 
as well as their unreliability in the long term, many international donors advocate technical 
support instead of subsidies in the start-up phases. External support can come in the form of 
technical/organizational assistance, for example, for conducting feasibility studies, providing 




One of the most important factors leading to the viability of disaster insurance is the trust of 
the stakeholders in the system. In this respect, not surprisingly, recent payouts in the case of 
Indian weather derivatives appear to have increased trust in the insurance product. Most 
farmers in the treatment villages of the BASIX program evaluation said they would like to 
purchase insurance for the next monsoon season in June 2005 with 60 percent citing security 
reasons, but another 30 percent citing the experience of the payout in 2004. Moreover, 
participants at meetings were the insurance scheme was explained understood the link of 
insurance to the crops and the idea of payouts and premiums reinforcing the confidence on the 
product (Giné, et al., 2006). 
However, such motivation for purchasing insurance could be problematic, as disaster 
insurance does not work if substantial claims occur every year. Moreover, in conjunction with  
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the basis risk, individual trigger failures may pose a serious risk to the viability and up-scaling 
of the scheme. In fact, the BASIX evaluation also found that risk-averse households were 
somewhat less likely to take up rainfall insurance, partly due to uncertainty about the 
insurance product itself.  
Trust can also be enhanced by stakeholder early participation in the design and 
implementation of insurance systems and products, such as demand surveys, product 
development, and/or product modification. For instance, based on household interviews, the 
decisive factor for uptake in the insurance program offered to households and micro-
businesses in Gujarat was the long-standing relationship that the intermediary NGO AIDMI 
had with the communities—all participants in the micro-insurance scheme have received 
support from it in the past. Otherwise, the scheme might have failed as the initial demand 
survey given to small businesses affected by earthquakes in the past revealed: there was a 
general mistrust of insurers, reluctance to pay for uncertain benefits in the future, and the 
belief that claims might not be settled properly. AIMDI is working on these issues by 
demonstrating prior payouts and highlighting successes (Aysan, 2005). 
Overall, the key aspects that governments should assess prior to any intervention in 
insurance schemes are the cost-benefit analysis of such projects, fiscal constraints; potential 
rent-seeking and regressive effects; the level of development of the financial sector; the 
possibility to bring in local partners that can bring groups of smallholders together; and the 
existing regulatory constraints (World Bank, 2005). 
  
Private-public interventions: scope for complementarities? 
It has been shown that public policy interventions are needed to put in place an effective 
safety net for high-risk poor communities. The obvious question that follows is to what extent 
these interventions are complimentary/substitutes to underlying traditional schemes and ways 
of responding to climate shocks. 
Provided some crowding out of informal risk sharing mechanism by public transfers 
is observed two broad answers have been provided in this respect: scaled up formal 
interventions superseding more traditional forms of coping with risk might be irrelevant if the 
social protection obtained is more complete. The weaknesses of existing schemes, in terms of 
limited coverage of some of the poorest groups and the most catastrophic risks, and the lack 
of full insurance offered, may be a sufficient reason to let formal social protection crowd out 
informal systems (Morduch and Sharma, 2002). To assess the impact of formal schemes in 
this respect therefore it is necessary to know the direct and indirect costs associated with the 
private efforts (for instance if they create poverty traps or not), what is the scale and incidence 
of crowding-out by age, region, ethnicity and household structure; and whether the 
government can provide the same services more cheaply after factoring the two previous 
considerations (Morduch and Sharma, 2002). 
On the other hand, to the extent that traditional institutions play a broader role, say as 
mechanisms for building up social capital by encouraging more interaction and trust within 
these networks, rather than merely risk transfer functions, crowding-out might have higher 
welfare costs than could be calculated via standard approaches. In this case, even if traditional 
institutions were not able to cope well with the changes brought about by a climate shock, it 
may be worth keeping the risk pool to cover natural disasters as it stands. Otherwise this may 
lead to the loss of social capital creation that characterizes them and thus undermine their 
sustainability (Dercon 2005). 
Sometimes there is clear ground for complimentary public-private initiatives. The 
case of micro-insurance products provision through MFIs is exemplary. Governments should 
try to crowd them in given their close contacts with the direct beneficiaries. Similarly, the 
provision of emergency relief could be greatly enhanced by the participation of informal 
community-based organizations and targeting could be improved if local risk sharing groups 
are taken into account. 
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1 Other terminology to classify different types of strategies that households call on while dealing with hardships is 
between ‘non-erosive’ and ‘erosive’ coping strategies, in order to differentiate those strategies which use extra 
sources of income and do not erode the subsistence base of the household, from those which do not entail such 
costs. (De Waal, 1989; Corbett, 1988) For instance, the sort of tradeoffs involved could be keeping children in 
school as an investment for the future as opposed to taking them out to put them to work; or staying in a formal 
sector job as opposed to self-employment. A more popular distinction that has been formalized within the food 
security literature is distinguishing between coping understood as a set of short-term responses to unusual food 
stress, and adaptation representing coping strategies that have become part of the normal cycle of activities of 
households. (Davies, 1996) It is important to mention that all these are analytical distinctions. In practice many 
strategies have elements of the different categories. 
2 Obstacles to the use of appropriate cash are partly institutional, in the sense that some donors continue to tie 
assistance to food aid. Reluctance to use cash is also a function of the individual attitudes of aid providers, and the 
sense that cash is threatening because it implies handing over power from the agency to the beneficiary. 
3 WFP’s cash transfer pilot program (CTPP) in Sri Lanka was implemented as part of the Tsunami emergency. The 
core evaluation conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) comprised an econometric 
assessment that included a baseline survey (October-November 2005) and a follow up survey done in February 
2006. The follow up included a sample of 1360 cash and food-receiving households. 
4 The project achieved its main aim of diversifying household income sources (villages that received cash were 
able to plant and harvest more and purchase more seeds than villages where the project was not implemented). It 
also increased access to water as the beneficiaries worked on water catchments, although progress toward 
restocking was more limited. Other positive secondary effects noted were that cash was used to repay debt, invest 
in seeds and tools and improve access to credit. More cash was spent on food during the hunger gap and only a 
small amount on livestock. 
5 In Aceh, in the aftermath of the tsunami the wage rate established by UNDP for its CFW programs was set at the 
typical urban casual labour wage for Banda Aceh. In some locations this exceeded the local rate for unskilled 
agricultural labour compromising the risk of crops being looked after. Similarly, in Killinochi, Oxfam suspended 
its cash for work program to free up labourers to secure the harvest (Harvey, 2007; Adams, 2007). A recent review 
of the Productive Safety Nets Program in Ethiopia found that some households were spending large amounts of 
time on public works projects at the expense of working on their own land (Kebede, 2006). 
6 This seem to be downplayed by the study as child labor is done at no cost in terms of schooling due to the price 
effect of the conditional transfer, but other outputs on school attainment could be compromised posing further 
questions into the viability of the transfer scheme. 
7 Emergency Needs Assessments (ENAs) are promoted by the United Nations’ World Food Programme to 
incorporate basic market components that will help inform on the impact of shocks and food aid on markets, as 
well as the potential for markets to respond in an emergency. 
8 For some organizations, a final reason why ex ante measures should be encouraged is because the technologies to 
predict climate risks are becoming more reliable and hence counter-cyclical planning is feasible. It is possible to 
predict generally where an event is likely to occur at some time in the near future (but not precisely when or its 
magnitude); and second, it is possible to know the sensitivity of human settlements to determine how exposed they 
will be to potentially destructive natural events. Therefore, disasters could be anticipated as more predicable 
events, with human and financial risks calculated in advance. Two recent studies on natural disaster risks confirm 
this pattern: the UNDP report Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development (UNDP, 2004), and the 
World Bank’s Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis (World Bank, 2005). 
9 The Social Risk Management Framework (SRM) developed in the World Bank is an example (Holzmann, 2001). 
10 Given the vast diversity of hazards facing Nicaragua (floods, droughts, volcanoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, 
tsunamis and landslides) and the limited capacity of small individual NGOs in the face of such threats this seems 
to be the more effective use of resources. 
11 Incidentally, micro-finance services also have an indirect impact on the vulnerability faced by women to climate 
shocks in a patriarchal society. The evidence shows that a woman’s control over her assets and her knowledge of 
social issues is enhanced after borrowing from BRAC’s micro-credit program.  
12 Two broad categories of micro-insurance can be distinguished: micro-insurance as an extension to microcredit 
and micro-savings operations because disasters pose a risk of default to the operations of MFIs  or community-
based organizations (CBOs). Micro disaster insurance is introduced either bundled with these other services or on 
a voluntary basis. And second, stand-alone insurance programs designed to deal with disaster risks. These 
instruments usually are embedded within  a more broad disaster risk management strategy (Mechler, 2006). 
13 The insurance product is accessible to farmers of modest income, and pays a return based on rainfall during 
three phases of the main growing season. The product is sold to farmers by BASIX, a microfinance institution, and 
rainfall risk is underwritten by ICICI, a large diversified Indian bank. For its evaluation, a household survey is 
currently being fielded by ICRISAT and World Bank. The sample comprises 1,052 farming households, including 
267 buyers, 186 non-buyers that attended the marketing meeting, and 299 non attendees in the treated villages. In 
addition, 300 farming households were interviewed in control villages. Take-up and impact is analyzed comparing 
buyers and non-buyers in marketed villages, but for impact even more important to compare buyers with potential 
buyers in control villages. At this stage only the 2004 round of data collection is available (Giné, et al., 2006; 
Lilleor, et al., 2005).   
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14 Households were asked qualitatively if purchasing insurance modified their labour supply, input usage and so 
on. Then using both treatment and control villages it was estimated through preliminary regressions whether 
insurance participation on the right-hand side and being properly instrumented had any statistically significant 
effect on saving or consumption.   
15 The principle of pooling is that the more uncorrelated risks added to a portfolio the lower the variance in the 
outcomes of the overall portfolio. 
16 Agroasemex is a state-owned institution which provides reinsurance to private companies and to self-Insurance 
Funds (fondos are mutualist schemes among the producers themselves, which by means of collecting premiums, 
allow the creation of reserves to pay indemnities and operation expenses). It also acts as a Development Agency to 
drive the growth of the agricultural insurance industry by means of designing and operating risk management 
products. 
17 The Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF) will have three functions: 1) supporting the technical assistance and 
infrastructure that are needed to develop index-based insurance; 2) aggregating and pooling risk from different 
developing countries to allow for improved pricing and risk transfer into the global reinsurance and capital 
markets; and 3) co-financing certain insurance products on a bilateral basis from donor to developing country 
(World Bank, 2005). 
18 The usual failures of insurance markets are asymmetric information that causes adverse selection (farmers have 
better knowledge than insurers about probability distribution of losses hence those bearing great risk purchase 
insurance) and moral hazard (incentive to take care of crop diminish once insured, but insurer cannot monitor this 
hazardous behavior) which in turn are often solved through higher transaction costs, such as co-payments and 
deductibles. However, offering insurance against climate shocks creates additional burdens as they are infrequent 
and covariate. Insurance contracts work better when risks are spreadable across the population so that only some 
put in a claim at the same time. The problem with infrequency is that purchasers are unwilling to pay full costs as 
it is proven that rare events are underestimated (tend to forget extreme low-yield events) while insurers tend to 
charge high premium rates (when risk estimates are ambiguous loads on insurance premiums can get 1.8 times 
higher that insuring events where probability and loss estimates are well specified) (World Bank, 2005).   
19 From the convergence of traditional insurance markets and capital markets new insurance products have 
resulted, particularly in developed countries. These include catastrophe bonds, insurance contracts and even 
derivative financial instruments like an active weather market. 
20 Back in 2000, a study on rainfall contracts to insure against drought during the critical crop growing season in 
four states of Mexico found that such contracts can reduce the variance of revenues (compensate revenue 
shortfalls) from the crops. Both rainfall and yield data were collected for the period 1980-99. To assess how well 
the rainfall contracts worked, the study assumed that insured farmer would purchase a value that would equal the 
mean yield value within a given production extension. The study then developed estimates of gross yield for the 
production extension with no insurance and with rainfall insurance. Results showed that for about 40 percent of the 
planted area in the four states, rainfall contracts could reduce relative yield risk by up to 30 percent (Skees et al. 
2005). 
21 Fonden is a Calamity Fund that allows to transfer risk associated with natural disasters through insuring public 
infrastructure and private assets in world financial markets that offer opportunities to pool large volumes of 
covariate risk on a global scale. 